"We believe a military strike is a feasible option" / Ein Militärschlag gegen Iran ist eine machbare Option"
Bipartisan Policy Center legt brisante Studie vor: Meeting the Challenge. U.S. Policy Towards Iranian Nuclear Development
Im September 2008 veröffentlichte das Bipartisan Policy Center, ein bedeutender Think Tank in den USA, der, wie der Name schon sagt, beiden großen Parteien verpflichtet ist, eine viel beachtete Studie über die US-Politik gegenüber dem Iran. Natürlich dreht sich darin alles um das Atomprogramm der iranischen Regierung und wie man dieser Herausforderung begegnen kann. Interessant dabei sind zwei Dinge: Erstens ist den Autoren der Studie vollkommen egal, ob der Iran nach der Atomwaffe strebt oder nicht. Zu bekämpfen ist er schon deshalb, weil er die Fähigkeit zur eigenen Urananreicherung erwirbt und damit "faktisch" zu einer Atommacht wird. Zweitens ist die Studie ein Musterbeispiel für die Art US-amerikanischer Politikberatung, die keine Skrupel zeigt, mögliche militärische Optionen offen anzusprechen, so als wäre es das normalste von der Welt, Angriffskriegs-Szenarien durchzuspielen. Auch der Zeitpunkt der Veröffentlichung, wenige Wochen vor der Präsidentschaftswahl, ist bedeutsam. Die Botschaft lautet: Die in der Studie aufgezeigten Wege zur Bekämpfung des Iran müssen vom künftigen US-Präsidenten gegangen werden, wer auch immer das sein wird.
Im Folgenden dokumentieren wir die Zusammenfassung der Studie. Das gesamte Dokument kann hier heruntergeladen werden: pdf-Datei (externer Link)
Report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Bipartisan Policy Center, September 2008
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A nuclear weapons-capable Islamic Republic of Iran is strategically untenable. This report is about preventing the untenable.
I. INTRODUCTION
While a peaceful, civilian nuclear program in Iran might be acceptable
under certain conditions—including an external source of nuclear fuel and
a stringent safeguards and inspections regime—it is the
decided judgment of this group that continued Iranian
enrichment of uranium and ineffectively monitored
operation of the light water reactor at Bushehr threatens
U.S. and global security, regional stability, and
the international nonproliferation regime. As a new
president prepares to occupy the Oval Offi ce, the Islamic
Republic’s defiance of its Non-Proliferation Treaty
safeguards obligations and United Nations Security
Council resolutions will be among the greatest foreign
policy and national security challenges confronting
the nation.
We believe a realistic, robust, and comprehensive approach—
incorporating new diplomatic, economic and
military tools in an integrated fashion—can prevent
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability. This
comprehensive approach should feature a new diplomatic
strategy underpinned by carefully calibrated financial
and military leverage. We agree successful resolution of
the Iranian problem requires laying a strong strategic
foundation that consists of coordinating with our allies
and other international players, building adequate
diplomatic, financial and military leverage and then
strategically applying such leverage within the context of
diplomatic engagement. There are no magic formulas or
silver bullets that will resolve this grave challenge easily,
and all courses of action or inaction carry serious tradeoffs.
Instead, the Iranian threat requires a serious bipartisan
strategy that is coordinated with our allies, addresses
concrete realities and advances U.S. national security.
II. FINDINGS
Threat
Iran’s nuclear development may pose the most significant
strategic threat to the United States during the next Administration.
A nuclear-ready or nuclear-armed Islamic
Republic ruled by the clerical regime could threaten
the Persian Gulf region and its vast energy resources,
spark nuclear proliferation throughout the Middle East,
inject additional volatility into global energy markets,
embolden extremists in the region and destabilize states
such as Saudi Arabia and others in the region, provide
nuclear technology to other radical regimes and terrorists
(although Iran might hesitate to share traceable nuclear
technology), and seek to make good on its threats to
eradicate Israel. The threat posed by the Islamic Republic
is not only direct Iranian action but also aggression
committed by proxy. Iran remains the world’s most active
state sponsor of terrorism, proving its reach from Buenos
Aires to Baghdad.
Even if Tehran does not actually build or test a nuclear
weapon, its establishment of an indigenous enrichment
capability places the region under a cloud of ambiguity
given uncertain Iranian capacities and intentions. Such
ambiguity will give the Islamic Republic a de facto nuclear
deterrent, which could embolden it to reinvigorate its
export of revolution and escalate support for terrorist
groups. We note with concern that the Russian contingent
at Bushehr is expected to increase substantially.
We do not believe that analogies to Cold War deterrence
are persuasive, and its proponents appear to us to have
underestimated the diffi culties of applying it to Iran.
First, nuclear deterrence was less eff ective than commonly
assumed; the United States and Soviet Union nearly
stumbled into nuclear confl ict on several occasions.
Secondly, the Islamic Republic’s extremist ideology
cannot be discounted. While most Iranians care little
for the theological exegesis of their rulers, the nuclear
program remains within the grasp not of the President,
a transient fi gure in Iran’s power structure, but rather
with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and
the Office of the Supreme Leader, proponents of extreme
ideologies.
Achieving nuclear capability would make the Islamic
Republic not only a regional threat, but also an international
one. A nuclear Islamic Republic would, in
eff ect, end the Non-Proliferation Treaty security regime.
Many, if not most, regional states might feel compelled
to develop their own indigenous nuclear capability or
accept coverage from another state’s nuclear umbrella.
Given historical instability in the region, the prospects
of a nuclear Middle East—possibly including Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey—are worrying enough, even
before the proliferation cascade continues across North
Africa and into Southern Europe. Iran’s continued nuclear
development also endangers global non-proliferation by
exposing weaknesses in the Non-Proliferation Treaty
and the inability or unwillingness of the international
community to enforce the Non-Proliferation Treaty or
United Nations resolutions on non-proliferation.
State of Play
While we agree that diplomacy should underlie U.S.
strategy, we also acknowledge that the current U.S. and
European diplomatic approach and several United Nations
Security Council resolutions have not succeeded
in stopping Iran from developing its nuclear capacity.
Since exposure of its clandestine enrichment program in
2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
has found that the Iranian government has installed
4,000 centrifuges in a facility designed to hold 50,000.
We recognize that IAEA inspections are insufficient.
By the IAEA’s own mandate, the organization can
only inspect declared nuclear facilities. Even if Iranian
authorities are discovered to have constructed parallel
but clandestine enrichment facilities, IAEA inspectors
would not necessarily be authorized to monitor them
without Iranian consent. In addition, much of the
Iranian enrichment debate overlooks the possibility
that Iranian officials could produce plutonium in their
heavy water plant at Arak or divert nuclear material from
spent reactor fuel, whether from Bushehr, Arak or other
nuclear plants.
While the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate reported
that Iran suspended warhead design work in 2003,
the National Intelligence Estimate does not leave room
for comfort. Its artifi cial separation between military
and civilian technology contradicts a reality where such
distinctions cannot be made. Despite Tehran’s protestations,
we do not believe its program is inherently peaceful
in nature. Tehran has a long record of cheating and
deception, and its extensive, if neglected, pipeline infrastructure
suggests that Iranian offi cials would have far
greater energy security had they invested a fraction of their
nuclear program’s cost in further development of their
natural gas fi elds and facilities, refi nery construction and
distribution network. Accordingly, we reject the Islamic
Republic’s claim that its nuclear program is motivated
only by energy concerns.
We also agree that the Iranian government’s legal argument
that the Non-Proliferation Treaty allows its current
nuclear development is not credible. Th e IAEA found
that the Islamic Republic is not compliant with its Non-
Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement and four
United Nations Security Council Resolutions demanded
cessation of Iranian uranium enrichment.
Commonly Discussed Solutions Won’t Work
Too often policymakers and commentators discuss strategy
in isolation, segregating diplomacy, economic
sanctions, and military options. As a result, recent U.S.
and international diplomatic eff orts have lacked both a
comprehensive strategy and vigorous execution, and have
in any case been met by Iranian defi ance. We believe this
is unwise, as only a realistic, robust, comprehensive approach
can succeed. The strategy we lay out focuses as
much on what the United States must do to prepare for
negotiations with the Islamic Republic as on the nature
and objectives of these negotiations. The Iranian challenge
permits no magic formula to allow the new president
to pull one policy lever at a time. Any U.S. strategy
should uphold the DIME paradigm and incorporate
simultaneous diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic strategies.
There are no risk-free solutions. The current diplomatic
approach has not succeeded. Iran has crossed various redlines
that the United States and the international
community have set down, thereby eroding Iranian
credibility as well as ours. There is ample evidence
that Iranian leaders have accelerated their defi ance of
international norms even as the European Union, United
States, and other powers have improved their incentive
packages. The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate’s
fi nding that the Islamic Republic maintained a nuclear
weapons program until 2003 coincides with the
European Union’s period of critical engagement and
former Iranian president Mohammed Khatami’s call
for a “Dialogue of Civilizations.” Indeed, we specifi cally
note the admission of Khatami’s former spokesman,
Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, on June 15, 2008, that a
strategy of insincere dialogue provided cover for the
Islamic Republic to import technology used to further
the Islamic Republic’s covert nuclear program. We also
note Tehran’s rejection of guarantees of nuclear fuel and
enrichment outside the Islamic Republic, both of which
would meet the needs of any program motivated solely
by energy concerns.
Nevertheless, it is not too late for diplomacy to succeed.
However, we believe it would be a mistake to acquiesce
to Iran’s demand that it be permitted to enrich uranium
under international inspections in Iran. Given the
Islamic Republic’s history of nuclear deception and its
ambition to obtain nuclear weapons and the limits of
IAEA safeguards and procedures, we see no combination
of international inspections or co-ownership of
enrichment-related facilities inside Iran that could
provide meaningful assurance to the international
community that such facilities will not contribute to
the nuclear weapons capability that Iran seeks. Given
that Iranian offi cials have thus far shown themselves
uncooperative in open-ended diplomatic processes
and that the Islamic Republic is already on its way
to nuclear weapons capability, any diplomatic engagement
must occur within a predetermined, short-term,
specified timeframe.
There are three components to a nuclear weapon—the
actual explosive device, delivery method, and fi ssile
material—the latter of which is the most technically
diffi cult to develop and most crucial to nuclear weapons
capability. Th erefore, we take “nuclear weapons-capable”
to mean possession of 20 kilograms of highly enriched
uranium or roughly 6 kilograms of plutonium, both
conservative estimates of how much fi ssile material is
necessary for a crude nuclear device. According to a
study commissioned by this Task Force, under certain
conditions, it would be technically possible for the
Islamic Republic to enrich 20 kilograms of highly
enriched uranium in four weeks or less; this could easily
occur between IAEA inspections and make it diffi cult
for the IAEA to detect. If nothing else, Tehran’s progress
means that the next administration might have little time
and fewer options to deal with this threat.
However, it is not too late for sanctions and economic
coercion to work. Despite near record oil prices, Iran’s
economy remains weak. While the United States, its
European partners, and the United Nations have imposed
some sanctions upon Tehran, each has a range of more
biting fi nancial tools at their disposal.
We recognize that a military strategy poses many difficult challenges. Th e U.S. military is capable of launching a devastating strike on Iran’s nuclear and military infrastructure—probably more decisively than the Iranian
leadership realizes—and could set back signifi cantly
the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program. However, unless
sustained by repeated strikes against rebuilt or newlydiscovered
sites over a period of years, military action alone
is likely only to delay Iranian nuclear development while
entailing risks of retaliation and regional destabilization
which could quickly escalate to full scale war.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
We believe that a new and comprehensive diplomatic
strategy, with calibrated financial and military leverage,
will be the next administration’s best option. We seek a
diplomatic solution to the Iranian challenge, involving
Washington’s direct engagement with Tehran, but only
under the right conditions. We also recognize that a new
President might need to turn to less optimal solutions
if diplomacy fails within a reasonable timeframe. This
report is concerned primarily with the resolution of
American and international concerns with Iranian
nuclear development. While a “grand bargain” resolving
all issues between Washington and Tehran would be
an attractive outcome, the United States does not have
the luxury of time given the intractability of issues and
the Iranian government’s decision to accelerate its nuclear
program.
Close coordination and allied support is critical to
build the strength and leverage necessary for a viable
diplomatic solution. Th us, before we can begin talking
directly to the Iranian leadership, there are a number of
steps that we must take to build leverage to use against
Iran and coordinate more closely with our allies and
other international players.
Alliance-Building
First, the new President should clarify to the Europeans
that only by standing firmly together diplomatically
and ratcheting up the pressure on the Islamic Republic
can we improve the chance to avoid more robust action.
Th e Europeans make war more likely if they do not
strengthen sanctions against Iran and eff ectively end all
commercial relations.
Secondly, the White House will need to make every effort
to convince regional allies like Saudi Arabia and the
Persian Gulf emirates to pressure China and, eventually,
Russia to join the United States in ratcheting up the diplomatic
pressure on Tehran, both to achieve United Nations
Security Council consensus and to assuage European
concerns that Moscow and Beijing seek to capitalize on
European commercial disengagement. (Of course, the
conflict in Georgia has made Russian cooperation more
challenging.) Given increasing demand for Middle Eastern
oil and gas, especially in East and South Asia, states
such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar have unique leverage over
China and India.
Such a strategy will not be easy to implement, but
it is necessary to pursue. To be successful, though, and
to signal how deeply the United States prioritizes resolution
of the Iran conflict, Washington should initiate and
sustain dialogue with regional rulers at a presidential,
vice presidential or national security advisor level. In
addition, the urgency of the challenge suggests that, upon
their election, representatives of the new administration,
with the blessing and cooperation of the current
administration, might quickly begin the necessary
outreach to U.S. allies. The Islamic Republic and the
international community should both understand
that U.S. policymakers will not sacrifice months of
increasingly limited time during a transition between
administrations.
Third, so long as Tehran feels confident that it enjoys
Moscow’s support and protection, the likelihood of a
diplomatic solution to the Iranian crisis diminishes.
The United States must prioritize its eff ort to motivate
Russia to step up its support for international efforts to
pressure Iran to abandon its quest for nuclear weapons.
One point of friction between the United States and
Russia is the U.S. initiative to install missile defenses
in Eastern Europe. The United States insists that these
defenses are directed against the emerging nuclear and
missile threat from Iran. Moscow, however, has strongly
objected to U.S. missile defense in the Czech Republic
and Poland on grounds that they pose a threat to Russia.
The United States should make clear to Moscow that
operationalization of the initial missile defense capability,
as well as any future expansion of it, will depend on the
evolution of the nuclear and missile threat from Iran.
Should Russia contribute to successful international
efforts to restrain the Iranian threat, it will lessen the
need to further develop and expand missile defenses
in Europe.
Another potential source of U.S. leverage over Russia
relates to bilateral nuclear cooperation. Such cooperation
is potentially valuable to Russia, not only with respect to
commerce with the United States in nuclear goods and
technology, but also with respect to the possible storage
or reprocessing in Russia of U.S.-origin spent nuclear
fuel. By some estimates, Russia could earn in excess of ten
billion dollars from the handling of such spent nuclear
fuel. In order for U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation
to proceed, it is necessary for a bilateral agreement
pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (a socalled
“123 Agreement”) to enter into force. The Bush
Administration submitted such an agreement to Congress
for review on May 13, 2008. Many members of Congress
have spoken out against this agreement because they
believe it is premature to extend the benefi ts of nuclear
cooperation with the United States to Russia so long as
Russia is not doing more to contain the Iranian nuclear
threat. It is unclear whether Congress will act to block
entry into force of this agreement, and even if it does not,
Congress may adjourn for the year before the agreement
can enter into force in 2008 under the procedures of the
Atomic Energy Act. Even if the agreement enters into
force, however, the United States should condition the
delivery to Russia of substantial financial benefits under
this agreement (e.g., from the storage of U.S.-origin spent
nuclear fuel) on fuller diplomatic cooperation by Russia
with regard to Iran. Such cooperation should include
not only support for tougher sanctions on Iran in the
U.N. Security Council, but also the denial of additional
assistance to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and
advanced conventional weapons to Iran.
Additionally, the next President should maintain a
constant dialogue with Israel. U.S. policymakers must
recognize the grave and existential danger that the
Islamic Republic poses to Israel. Believing its existence
threatened, Israel could feel compelled to launch a strike
to deny the Islamic Republic nuclear weapons capability.
We recognize that Israeli politicians do not believe that a
nuclear Iran can be contained. Only if Israeli policymakers
believe that U.S. and European policymakers will ensure
that the Islamic Republic does not gain nuclear weapons
will the Israelis be unlikely to strike Iran independently.
It will be up to the President to consult with Israel and
provide sufficient assurance so that they do not feel
compelled to undertake unilateral action.
Leverage Building
To build additional leverage, states and international
organizations should apply both unilateral and multilateral
sanctions before and during any diplomatic
rapprochement. These can be lifted as Iranian officials
comply with their obligations. Such sanctions should
include not only further broad UN Security Council
resolutions, but also more targeted sanctions against
Iran’s financial and energy sectors. When considering
sanctions, the next President will need to decide whether
to target them to specific individuals and industries or
more broadly across Iranian society in order to encourage
domestic pressure on the Iranian leadership.
Fortunately, the next U.S. administration has many financial
tools at its disposal. The U.S. Treasury Department’s
quiet diplomacy with European banks should continue.
Many European banks and companies have stepped
back from operations in Iran when confronted with evidence
of the Islamic Republic’s deceptive financial
practices. Washington should press for expansion
of sanctions upon Iran’s banking sector. Even without
European acquiescence, the next occupant of the Oval
Offi ce should consider applying Section 311 of the U.S.A.
Patriot Act to designate additional Iranian banks up to
and including Bank Markazi, the central bank, because
of their involvement in deceptive financial practices.
Such action would, in effect, remove Iranian banks from
the international financial stage. Negotiations could
commence immediately to achieve greater transparency
in Iranian financial dealings.
Closing existing U.S. and international sanction regime
loopholes, through which Iran can procure technology
and equipment for its energy sector is as important as
utilizing new fi nancial tools against the Islamic Republic.
For example, Washington should end the provision in
U.S. trade regulations that allows subsidiaries of U.S.
corporations to conduct relatively normal trade with
Iran. Under U.S. trade law, subsidiaries are incorporated
under the laws of the country in which they are located,
and therefore are not bound by the provisions of the
1995 Executive order (12957) banning U.S. trade with
and investment in Iran. Th erefore, U.S. subsidiaries can,
without violating U.S. law, export to Iran oil drilling
equipment and other goods that contradict the intent
of U.S. policy, which is to deny the Islamic Republic
the means to develop and exploit its energy sector. Th e
group therefore supports initiatives, such as those in
pending legislation, to apply to U.S. subsidiaries all
provisions of the trade and investment ban as if they were
U.S. corporations.
Another loophole is that there is no time limit in
the Iran Sanctions Act for any administration to determine
whether an investment in Iran’s energy sector
is a violation of the Act. Because of this loophole, no
determinations have been made as to whether at least
a dozen major investments in Iran since 1999 constitute
sanctionable violations.
A third loophole involves re-exportation of U.S. goods.
Under the 1995 U.S. trade ban, knowingly re-exporting
U.S. goods to Iran is prohibited. Implementation, however,
depends on enforcement, which has been lax, due
at least in part to resource constraints. The Commerce
Department should deploy a greater number of export
control officers to well known hubs for re-export of U.S.
goods to Iran such as Dubai.
Diplomatic Engagement
Embarking upon a diplomatic solution with Iran will
force a number of additional policy decisions. First, there
is a question about what incentives the United States,
Europe, and the international community will present
to the Islamic Republic to encourage its compliance. We
believe that the incentives already offered to Iran—an
end to isolation, spare parts for its aging aircraft fleet,
upgrades for its domestic oil and gas production, political
cooperation—should remain part of any future package.
Calibrating lift ing of sanctions with Iranian compliance
is another incentive, as are potential security guarantees
and assurances. Th e President will need to balance any
off er of new incentives with the knowledge that Iranian
offi cials may see such off ers as weakness to exploit. Both
the Iranian regime and other potential proliferators
may also interpret willingness to offer new incentives as
rewards for Iran’s defiance.
Second, the new President will need to determine whether
to maintain the policy of the Bush Administration
and the EU-3 against negotiating with Tehran over the
nuclear issue unless the Islamic Republic suspends its
enrichment-related activities, or drop this precondition
to negotiations. Any formal dialogue with Iran absent
suspension of enrichment could backfire: Not only
would the United States implicitly void all UN Security
Council resolutions demanding a cessation of Iranian
uranium enrichment, but Iranian authorities are likely
to interpret U.S. flexibility as acquiescence to the Iranian
position that it must be permitted to enrich—all the
more reason to increase multilateral sanctions as any new
incentives are contemplated.
Should the new President decide, however, that the only
way to test Tehran’s seriousness about resolving the nuclear
dispute is to drop all preconditions to negotiation,
several principles should be observed: First, the United
States should only enter negotiation from a position of
strength. This means that the United States must act in
concert and with the full support of its Allies. It must
be able to show either that it and its Allies have already
ratcheted up economic pressure on Iran, or are prepared
to do so in a meaningful manner should the Islamic
Republic not agree to abandon its quest for nuclear
weapons. Second, it must be clear that any U.S.-Iranian
talks will not be open-ended, but will be limited to a predetermined
time period so that Tehran does not try to
‘run out the clock.’
We believe that an intensive diplomatic eff ort of this
kind is necessary to demonstrate a united front and
create new leverage against Iran. Direct negotiations
with the Iranian regime can only succeed if we receive
the cooperation needed by European allies, as well as key
Persian Gulf countries, China, and India.
If Diplomacy Does Not Succeed
Should diplomatic engagement not achieve its objectives
within the set timeframe, the next President must turn
to more intensive sanctions. While the most effective
sanctions would target Iran’s oil and gas industries—
Tehran’s chief source of income—the new President will
need to balance the need for effective strategies with real
world political and economic concerns about any action
that would significantly impact the supply and price of
oil. Some have proposed an embargo of gasoline exports
to Iran but, in practice, there are too many suppliers
to enforce fully without a blockade. However, even a
partially effective embargo might have a psychological
impact on the Iranian people, representing a cost for the
Iranian leaders. An actual blockade of Iranian gasoline
imports would have a much greater impact since, despite
rationing, the Islamic Republic still must import about
25 percent of its refi ned petroleum needs, the majority
of which enters Iran through sea ports. The Iranian
regime feels vulnerable about its stability and a tighter
rationing of gasoline or a spike in gasoline prices would
likely spark further social discontent and political upheaval.
Blockading Iranian gasoline imports would be a
significant measure, and should only be employed should
diplomatic engagement fail in its objectives. Should a
blockade of gasoline imports not persuade Tehran, the
next President would want to consider extending the
blockade to Iran’s oil exports, thus cutting off the source
of 80 percent of the government’s revenue. A blockade of
Iran’s current two million barrels per day of oil exports
would likely be the last sanction possible prior to an
escalation into military action. It might prove crippling
to the Iranian government, but it could only be imposed
for a very short period of time given the consequences
it would have on the oil market, various net energyimporting
countries and the global economy. Estimates
suggest that removing two million barrels per day of
supply, combined with the perception by markets of
dramatically increased geopolitical instability, could
induce an unprecedented spike in the global price of oil.
The Islamic Republic would almost certainly claim such
blockades were acts of war, and would likely respond
by attempting to destroy, either directly or by proxy,
southern Iraq’s oil export facilities, which supply close to
two million barrels per day for the global market. Iran
could also respond by reducing or ceasing its own oil
exports. Iranian forces would also be expected to try to
disrupt the passage of oil tankers through the Strait of
Hormuz, through which twenty percent of the world’s
oil transits.
Any blockade of Iranian energy imports or exports
should be accompanied by a coordinated International
Energy Agency announcement to release if necessary
government strategic oil reserves. We caution that U.S.
Strategic Petroleum Reserve might not be able to release
its nameplate amount of 4.4 million barrels per day for
90 days; the actual drawdown might be closer to half that
number, or 2.2 million barrels per day. The new President
could also improve the psychology of the market by
announcing initiatives that, if implemented, would reduce
demand for oil and increase supply.
The President would have to also coordinate any Western
action to sanction or restrict Iran’s energy sector with
senior leadership in Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf
emirates to encourage those countries to pump more oil
and store it in key consuming areas. The United States
should also work with those countries to improve the
security of their facilities. In addition, Washington should
work closely with Riyadh to upgrade the trans-Arabian
pipeline and the IPSA pipeline to enable Persian Gulf states
to transport their oil to the Saudi port of Yanbu on the
Red Sea. This would mitigate some risks and vulnerability
to possible blockage of Strait of Hormuz, although it
risks increasing Saudi leverage over U.S. policies. Working
closely with the Iraqi and Turkish government to refurbish
the two pipelines from northern Iraq to Turkey would
also reduce the reliance on the transit of crude through
the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, before it imposed any
energy blockades on Iran, the U.S. and its allies would
have to first move sufficient military assets to the region in
anticipation of kinetic action against Iran and in order to
secure shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz.
Informational Campaign
Simultaneous to all such diplomatic and economic
efforts must be a concerted informational campaign.
Investment in Radio Farda and Voice of America should
be increased multifold to a level commensurate with the
strategic threat which the Islamic Republic now poses.
More care should also be taken to ensure that U.S.-
funded Persian-language broadcasting remains relevant
to ordinary Iranians wishing to better understand the
U.S. position and concerns.
We also recognize that while the Islamic Republic’s
nuclear efforts pose a threat, the Iranian people are unfortunate
victims of a situation over which they exert
little or no control. It is in the long-term interests of the
United States to see the far more moderate core of Iranian
society increase its influence over their government. It
is not the place of Washington to support any political
groupings outside Iran or ethnic interests inside the
country. However, the next president should recognize
the importance of an independent civil society and trade
union movement inside Iran and encourage their growth
through any appropriate means.
Military Options
There are two aspects to the military option: boosting our
diplomatic leverage leading up to and during negotiations,
and preparing for kinetic action. For either objective, the
United States will need to augment its military presence
in the region. This should commence the first day the new
President enters office, especially as the Islamic Republic
and its proxies might seek to test the new administration.
It would involve pre-positioning additional U.S. and allied
forces, deploying additional aircraft carrier battle groups
and minesweepers, emplacing other war materiel in the
region, including additional missile defense batteries,
upgrading both regional facilities and allied militaries,
and expanding strategic partnerships with countries
north of Iran such as Azerbaijan and Georgia in order to
maintain operational pressure from all directions.
While current deployments are placing a strain on U.S.
military assets, the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq and
Afghanistan off ers distinct advantages in any possible
confrontation with Iran. The United States can bring in
troops and materiel to the region under the cover of the
Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, thus maintaining a degree
of strategic and tactical surprise. The United States can
also more easily insert Special Forces and intelligence
personnel into Iran and protect key assets of our regional
allies. Some augmentation of U.S. regional assets should
be done overtly and publicly, to signal to the Iranians
and to our regional allies American seriousness over
the Iranian nuclear issue. Thus, for example, the United
States would want to carry out a show of force, including
the deployment of additional carrier battle groups to the
waters off Iran and the conduct of broad exercises with
allies. Such plans and deployments would also be part of
an effort to demonstrate to the Islamic Republic that it
would lose more than it would gain by becoming nuclear
weapons-capable.
If all other approaches—diplomatic, economic, financial,
non-kinetic—fail to produce the desired objective, the
new President will have to weigh the risks of failure to
set back Iran’s nuclear program sufficiently against the
risks of a military strike. We believe a military strike is
a feasible option and must remain a last resort to retard
Iran’s nuclear development, even if it is unlikely to solve
all our challenges and will certainly create new ones.
Whether to pursue a military strike remains, of course, a
political decision. When confronted with the possibility
that the Islamic Republic may transition into a nuclear
weapons state, the next Administration might feel
that the risks of a military strike are outweighed by the
transformative dangers of living with a nuclear-armed
Iran—such as dominance over the Persian Gulf region
and its vast energy resources, a sustained spike in energy
prices, nuclear proliferation throughout the Middle
East, a radicalization and possible destabilization of
the region, increased terrorist action in the region and
beyond, possible provision of nuclear technology to
other radical regimes and terrorists, and possible action
to eradicate the State of Israel. We also understand that
the nature of intelligence is that it seldom gives as full
or as certain a picture as desired when it comes time to
make a decision. No matter how much the next president
may wish a military strike not be necessary, it is prudent
that he begin augmenting the military lever, including
continuing the contingency planning that we have to
assume is already happening, from his first day in offi ce.
A military strike would have to target not only Iran’s
nuclear infrastructure, but also its conventional military
infrastructure in order to suppress an Iranian response.
However, it is important that any planning also occur
simultaneously for the period immediately following,
both providing food and medical assistance within Iran,
as well as protecting regional allies from either direct or
indirect Iranian response. Because there will be political,
diplomatic, and strategic fallout from military action, it is
important that plans be in place to contain such fallout as
much as possible.
Military action against the Islamic Republic would incur
significant risks, whether such action involves a limited
air strike or a more sustained air and naval campaign such
as the imposition of no-fly zones and a full blockade.
Any military action would run the risk of significant U.S.
and allied losses, rallying Iranians around an unstable
and ideologically extreme regime, triggering wide-scale
Hezbollah and Hamas rocket attacks against Israel, and
producing unrest in a number of the Persian Gulf states.
An initial air campaign would likely last several days to
several weeks and target both key military and nuclear
installations. It should not target civilian facilities, and
might not require ground troops beyond Special Forces.
While a successful bombing campaign would retard
Iranian nuclear development, Iran would undoubtedly
retain its nuclear knowhow. It would also require
years of continued vigilance, both to strike previously
undiscovered nuclear sites and to ensure that Iran does
not resurrect its military nuclear program.
IV: CONCLUSION
It may be too late to keep Iran from becoming a nuclear
power state, but it is not too late to prevent the Islamic
Republic from becoming a nuclear weapons threat.
There are no easy solutions. Any diplomatic solution
requires a comprehensive strategy involving economic,
military, and informational components undertaken in
conjunction with allied and regional states. It is up to
the government in Tehran to determine what travails the
Iranian people must endure before such an agreement
is made. Th e stakes are enormous. They involve not
only U.S. national security, but also regional peace and
stability, energy security, the efficacy of multilateralism,
and the preservation of the nuclear non-proliferation
treaty regime.
Any agreement, however, marks not the end of the crisis,
but the beginning of a sustained phase for which the
United States, its allies, and international agencies must
also prepare. Iranian compliance with its commitments
must be verifiable, and any Iranian nuclear activity must
be monitored comprehensively and in real time, not just
by periodic inspections.
Iran is an important country and we would welcome its
return to the international community if its government
adheres to its international obligations. Because Iran is a
unique and strategically significant country with a rich
history, it is essential that the new President and other
policymakers understand its complexities. Likewise, the
technicalities of nuclear enrichment are oft en discussed
in the abstract, but the details of different enrichment
methods and capacities matter. Accordingly, in addition
to formulating a strategy to resolve the Iranian nuclear
crisis, we have also endeavored to provide a resource
to better understand not only the complexities of the
Islamic Republic’s governance and decision-making,
the often divergent attitudes of the Iranian regime and
public, and the pros and cons surrounding many of the
strategies so oft en discussed by policymakers. Finally,
we strive to provide a technical analysis of both past and
potential future Iranian nuclear enrichment strategies.
Quelle: Meeting the Challenge. U.S. Policy Towards Iranian Nuclear Development (pdf-Datei, externer Link), September 2008, Seite I-XV.
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