Rüstung, Abrüstung und internationale Sicherheit / Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
Sipri-Jahrbuch 2008 veröffentlicht / SIPRI YEARBOOK 2008: "A window of opportunity for arms control"
Im Folgenden informieren wir zunächst in einer deutschen Zusammenfassung
über die wichtigsten Ergebnisse des am 9. Juni in Stockholm vorgelegten
SIPRI-Jahrbuchs 2008. Im Anschluss dokumentieren wir die Presseerklärung des SIPRI sowie die Zusammenfassungen der Kapitel aus dem Jahrbuch (englisch):
Rüstung, Abrüstung und internationale Sicherheit
Sipri-Jahrbuch 2008 veröffentlicht
Am 9. Juni wurde in Stockholm der neue Jahresbericht des wohl bekanntesten Friedensforschungsinstituts der Welt, des SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), vorgestellt. Das Jahrbuch trägt den überraschenden Titel: "A window of opportunity for arms control in 2009-2009". Dieser Titel steht in deutlichem Kontrast zu den Fakten, über die SIPRI berichtet.
Die wichtigsten sind:
-
Bewaffnete Konflikte sind komplexer und hartnäckiger als vermutet und die traditionelle Klassifizierung von Konflikt ist zusammengebrochen.
- Weltrüstungsausgaben, Waffenproduktion und internationaler Waffenhandel nehmen weiter zu.
-
Die weltweiten Militär- und Rüstungsausgaben beliefen sich 2007 auf 1.339 Milliarden US-Dollar, das entspricht einem realen Anstieg gegenüber dem Vorjahr von 6 Prozent (konstante Preise)
- Die Waffenverkäufe der 100 größten Rüstungsunternehmen der Welt stiegen 2007 gegenüber 2005 um 8 Prozent (laufende Preise)
- Im Vierjahreszeitraum 2003 bis 2007 war der internationale Handel mit konventionellen Waffen 7 Prozent höher als in der Periode von 2002-2006
-
Während 8 Staaten beinahe 10.200 einsatzfähige Nuklearwaffen besitzen, sind Rüstungskontrolle- und Nichtverbreitungs-Verhandlungen ins Stocken geraten oder machen nur geringe Fortschritte.
- Die Bemühungen der Staaten, die Proliferation von Massenvernichtungswaffen - atomare, biologische und chemische - zu verhindern, richten sich zunehmend auf Individuen und nicht-staatliche Gruppen und weniger auf Staaten selbst.
Um auf solche Herausforderungen zu antworten, ist es dringend nötig, der Rüstungskontrolle neues Leben einzuhauchen und sie zu einem Mainstream-Moment werden zu lassen. SIPRI weist in diesem Zusammenhang auf die neuen politischen Führungen in der UNO, in Frankreich, Deutschland, Japan, Russland, Großbritannien und - ab Januar 2009 - den USA hin. Diese neuen Führungen werden es "politisch möglich" finden, konkrete Aktionen an der Rüstungskontroll- und Abrüstungsfront zu unternehmen. Technologische Fortschritte ermöglichen eine größere Sicherheit bei der Beobachtung und Verifikation von Rüstungskontrollabkommen.
Die Bewegung zur Wiederbelebung der Rüstungskontrolle müsse quer durch die politische Rechts- Links-Einteilung und von "Falken und Tauben", von "Nationalisten und Internationalisten" gleichermaßen und von Hoffnung und Furcht reichen, sagte der Direktor des Instituts, Dr. Bates Gill. Ein globaler Konsens über die Rüstungskontrolle und Abrüstung müsse sowohl die Atomwaffenstaaten als auch die Nicht-Atomwaffen-Staaten einschließen und bedürfe der Unterstützung durch "think tanks" und andere Nicht-Regierungs-Organisationen. Gill betonte, dass trotz der zahlreichen Hindernisse sich ein "neues Fenster der Gelegenheit" eröffne zur Verwirklichung konstruktiver Fortschritte bei der Rüstungskontrolle und der Abrüstung. Es läge im gemeinsamen Interesse von Bürger/innen und Regierungen, "pragmatische Schritte in die richtige Richtung zu unternehmen".
Der SIPRI-Jahresbericht enthält im Einzelnen Berichte, die über Folgendes Auskunft geben:
-
2007 gab es 14 größere bewaffnete Konflikte gab. Mit dem Zusammenbruch der traditionellen Klassifikation von Konflikten sind neue Ansätze zur Lösung von Konflikten erforderlich; Gewaltgruppen sollten in politische Prozesse integriert und nicht marginalisiert werden.
-
2007 haben insgesamt 61 "Friedensoperationen" stattgefunden, 2 mehr als im Jahr davor; das war die höchste Zahl seit 1999. Die Zahl der dabei eingesetzten Personen erreichte den bisher höchsten Stand von 169.467; mit dieser Zunahme wird die entscheidende Prä-Missions-Phase eines Friedenseinsatzes komplexer;
-
Die Weltausgaben für Rüstung und Militär stiegen 2007 auf insgesamt 1.339 Milliarden Dollar; das entspricht einem Anteil von 2,5 Prozent des Welt-Bruttoinlandsprodukts oder 202 Dollar pro Kopf der Weltbevölkerung. Das bedeutet einen realen Anstieg von 6 Prozent gegenüber 2006 und von sage und schreibe 45 Prozent gegenüber 1998. Antriebskräfte diese Entwicklung waren das Streben nach einem globalen oder regionalen Großmacht-Status, aktuelle oder potenzielle Konflikte und die Erreichbarkeit ökonomischer Ressourcen.
-
Die Produktion von Waffen steigt weltweit an. Die Waffenverkäufe der 100 größten Rüstungsunternehmen (die "SIPRI Top 100") beliefen sich 2007 auf 315 Milliarden Dollar, das waren 8 Prozent mehr als im Jahr 2006. Die Liste der Top 100 wird beherrscht von US-Unternehmen, sowohl zahlenmäßig als auch von der Finanzleistung, gefolgt von westeuropäischen Firmen.
-
Der internationale Handel von konventionellen Waffen stieg in der Periode 2003-2007 um 7 Prozent (gegenüber der Periode 2002-2006). Auf die fünf größten Rüstungsexporteure der Periode 2003-2007 - es sind dies die USA, Russland, Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien - entfielen 80 Prozent aller Rüstungsverkäufe.
-
Russlands wieder gewonnenes Selbstbewusstsein drückt sich darin aus, dass es sich auf der internationalen Bühne besser durchsetzen kann. Russland ist indessen eher bestrebt, mit dem Westen partnerschaftliche Beziehungen aufrechtzuerhalten, als diese Beziehungen aufs Spiel zu setzen.
-
Die Rolle von Exportkontrollen zur Unterstützung der wichtigsten multilateralen Nichtverbreitungs-Verträge wird heute ergänzt durch die bedeutende Rolle, die der UN-Sicherheitsrat bei deren Durchsetzung in bestimmten Ländern spielt (z.B. Iran und Nordkorea).
-
Experten stimmen weithin darin überein, dass eine neue pandemische Grippe auftauchen könnte, welche die globale Gesundheit und Sicherheit bedroht (es geht hierbei um die Avian-Grippe, eine Variation des H5N1-Virus).
(Übertragung aus dem Englischen: P. Strutynski)
Press Release
SIPRI YEARBOOK 2008
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
SIPRI’s annual compendium of data and analysis of developments in security and
conflicts, military spending and armaments and non-proliferation, arms control
and disarmament is launched today at a press conference at 11:00–13:15, Press Room, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Fredsgatan 6, Stockholm. SIPRI authors and researchers will be available for interview following a presentation of the book.
A window of opportunity for arms control in 2008–2009
The next 12 months promise the beginnings of the first serious discussions of arms control and disarmament in more than a decade, according to Dr Bates Gill, Director of SIPRI, speaking at the launch of SIPRI Yearbook 2008.
As shown in the new edition of the SIPRI Yearbook:
-
Armed conflicts are far more complex and intractable than is often thought and the traditional classification of conflicts is breaking down.
- Military spending, arms production and international arms transfers are all on the rise:
-
world military spending totalled $1339 billion in 2007, a real-terms increase of 6% since 2006;
- arms sales by the 100 largest arms-producing companies in 2006 increased by 8% in nominal
terms over 2005;
-
international transfers of major conventional weapons were 7% higher over the period 2003–2007 than in 2002–2006.
- While 8 states possess almost 10 200 operational nuclear weapons, many arms control and nonproliferation agreements are faltering or making little progress.
- Efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, biological or chemical—are increasingly focused on individuals and non-state groups, rather than states.
In response to these challenges, there is growing urgency around the globe to bring new life and a mainstream momentum to arms control. There are new leaders in the UN, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, the UK and, from January 2009, the USA—who will find it politically possible to take concrete action on the arms control and disarmament front. Encouraging technological developments
allow greater certainty in the monitoring and verification of arms control agreements.
‘The movement to reinvigorate arms control efforts must stake common ground across the political divides of right and left, “doves” and “hawks”, nationalists and internationalists, hope and fear,’ said Gill. A global consensus on arms control and disarmament must include both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states and be supported by think tanks and other non-governmental organizations.
‘Voices from across the political spectrum are coming to recognize again the value of arms control in the face of looming threats to humankind,’ said Gill, ‘Although we face tremendous obstacles, a new window of opportunity is opening to realize constructive progress on arms control and disarmament. It is clearly in the interest of citizens and governments alike to take pragmatic and positive steps in the right direction.’
In SIPRI Yearbook 2008, SIPRI reports that
-
There were 14 major armed conflicts in 2007. With the breakdown of the traditional classification
of conflicts, new approaches to conflict resolution are needed. Violent groups should be integrated
into political processes, not marginalized.
- 61 peace operations were conducted in 2007, two more than in 2006 and the highest number
since 1999, and the number of personnel deployed to such operations reached an all-time high of
169 467. With this growth, the crucial pre-mission phase of a peace operation deployment is
becoming more complex.
- World military spending totalled $1339 billion in 2007, corresponding to 2.5% of world GDP and
$202 per capita. This is a real-terms increase of 6% since 2006 and of 45% since 1998. The factors
driving increases in world military spending include aspiration to global or regional power status,
actual or potential conflicts, and the availability of economic resources.
- Global arms production is increasing. Arms sales by the 100 largest arms-producing companies
(the ‘SIPRI Top 100’) amounted to $315 billion in 2006, an increase of 8% in nominal terms over
2005. US companies dominate the Top 100, both numerically and financially, with West European
companies some way behind.
•
- International transfers of major conventional weapons over the period 2003–2007 were 7%
higher than in 2002–2006. The 5 largest arms suppliers for the period 2003–2007—the USA,
Russia, Germany, France and the UK—accounted for about 80% of the volume of transfers.
- Russia’s new-found self-confidence, supported by revenue from its natural resources, is allowing it
to assert itself more on the international stage. However, Russia appears eager to maintain
cooperative relations with the West and is unlikely to risk challenging it too forcefully.
- The role of export controls in supporting the main multilateral non-proliferation treaties is now
supplemented by the important role that they play in implementing decisions of the UN Security
Council on particular countries (such as Iran or North Korea).
- Experts widely agree that another influenza pandemic is on the horizon, jeopardizing global health
and security.
Source: http://www.sipri.org/
Introduction. A call to arms control
Bates Gill
The next one to two years
will see far more high-level
discussion and debate on the merits
of arms control and disarmament.
This emerges from a broadening
consensus around the world that
more serious and effective arms
control and disarmament measures
should be implemented. Two trends
have converged in ways that raise
the arms control policy debate to
new and interesting levels. One
points to increasing concerns about,
threats to and the potential collapse
of long-standing arms control and
non-proliferation agreements and
understandings. The other points to
new and emergent opportunities for
more effective arms control, nonproliferation
and disarmament steps.
There are a number of reasons
to see a widening window of
opportunity for important gains
in arms control. Disarmament
and related confidence- and
security-building measures by
the two principal nuclear weapon
powers—Russia and the USA—will
be especially important, and these
two states should take a number
of critical steps forward in the
near term. A broader, global effort
will also be needed which reaches
beyond these two countries, which
pulls in both nuclear and nonnuclear
weapon states, and which
firmly stakes out common ground
across political divides.
Three caveats are in order which
should cast a more realistic light on
coming prospects for arms control.
First, the priorities of the next US
Administration will have a critical
role in shaping the progress for arms
control. Second, while progress
on existing and potentially new
multilateral treaties might garner
most international attention, these
approaches should not overshadow
other mechanisms which hold
out good prospects for concrete
progress in arms control and
disarmament. Finally, arms control
and disarmament cannot solve all
the world’s problems. For ‘arms
control’ to have greater relevance,
the traditional meaning of the term
should undergo some broadening to
encompass non-treaty- and nonstate-
based approaches to security
building. These approaches can
also effectively lower the threat of
unnecessary and indiscriminate
violence while building confidence
among security actors at the
international, national and sub-state
levels.
Voices from across the political
spectrum are coming to recognize
again the value of arms control
in the face of looming threats to
humankind. While moving ahead
faces tremendous obstacles, in the
coming years a new window of
opportunity will open even wider
to realize constructive progress on
arms control and disarmament. It is
clearly in the interest of citizens and
governments alike to take pragmatic
and positive steps in the right
direction.
1. Euro-Atlantic security institutions and relationships
Jean-Yves Haine, Gunilla Herolf and Zdzislaw Lachowski
During 2007 the main Euro-
Atlantic actors confronted
renewed estrangements and
managed old ones. The outstanding
features of this dynamic were
sharpened differences between
Russia and other states of the Euro-
Atlantic community, the challenges
confronting the European Union’s
cohesion and efficiency and the
lack of purpose of the Atlantic
community’s security cooperation.
Greater pragmatism characterized
the United States’ security policy.
The most significant development
in Euro-Atlantic relations in 2007
was Russia’s restored confidence
and aspirations to equal status in
security matters with its Western
partners. Increasingly assured by the
lucrative exploitation of its natural
resources and emboldened by their
use as a successful political weapon,
Russia has returned to its traditional
policy of playing its European
partners against each other—
seeking to weaken the transatlantic
ties and to reassert its influence
over the former Soviet states. At the
same time, Russia appears eager to
maintain cooperative relations with
the West and it is unlikely to risk
challenging it too forcefully.
The EU adopted the Lisbon
Treaty, which broadly maintains
the main elements of the rejected
2004 Constitutional Treaty,
especially in foreign and security
policy areas. However, the EU
has not yet fully recovered from
the Constitutional Treaty debacle,
which has considerably hampered
its programme for the wider
European neighbourhood, external
relations and common foreign and
security policy. The EU can now
harness its considerable potential by
translating the new legal framework
into political action. Yet the treaty
ratification processes and the
differences over leadership and new
competences may absorb the EU’s
energies by emphasizing once again
national preferences and opt-outs
rather than genuine foreign agendas.
The challenges of the transatlantic
partnership are increasingly global.
Consensus and commitment are
difficult to achieve and sustain.
When acting together, the
partnership still suffers from selfimposed
constraints, divergent
approaches or insufficient leverage.
The European–US rapprochement
that emerged in 2007 was based
more on acknowledged weaknesses
than projected strengths. In
the USA, the policies that had
diminished the country’s influence
and prestige at home and abroad
have largely been abandoned
in favour of a more pragmatic
approach to world affairs. Yet the
USA remains heavily involved in
Iraq and its diplomatic impact has
shrunk globally. With a pending
election, no foreseeable exit from
Iraq and a worsening economy, the
USA may become more inwardlooking.
Thus, transition will be the
Euro-Atlantic community’s theme in
2008 and 2009.
2. Trends in armed conflicts
Ekaterina Stepanova
In 2007 the fragmentation of
armed violence, the diversification
of armed actors and the blurring of
boundaries between categories of
violence and between their actors
were among the predominant
trends in armed conflicts. These
patterns were evident in some of the
world’s deadliest armed conflicts
and conflict-prone zones, including
Darfur (Sudan), Iraq and Pakistan.
While changes in the US-led
military surge and counterinsurgency
strategy had some
stabilizing effect in parts of Iraq
from mid-2007, the overall security
situation remained uneven. The
modest decline in inter-sectarian
violence in some mixed areas can
also be attributed to increased
population displacement. At the
local level, the rise of militant
power brokers ranging from
neighbourhood security groups
to street gangs and smuggling
networks contributed to the further
fragmentation of violence.
Decline in state-based fighting
in Darfur did not lead to improved
security conditions. The main
patterns of violence continued
to shift from state-based armed
confrontation to a complex mix
of less intensive but numerous
mini conflicts. Rebel, defecting
and state-affiliated armed groups
switched alliances depending on
circumstances and engaged in
predatory violence, local powerbrokering
and cross-border
incursions. Violence against
civilians continued unabated, and
the number of people killed by tribal
and factional violence was greater
than the number killed in battles
between the government and the
rebels.
In Pakistan, following the
breakdown of a ceasefire between
the government and pro-Taliban
militants, the tribal areas saw some
of the fiercest violence for several
years, including an increase of
incursions into Afghanistan, attacks
on government forces and suicide
terrorism. Growing ‘Talibanization’
of the tribal areas was paralleled
by Islamist radicalization across
Pakistan that culminated in the
Red Mosque siege in July 2007.
The overlapping of local, national,
regional and transnational political
and religious violence in Pakistan
was demonstrated by the dynamics
of terrorist activity, including the
assassination of former Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto.
Major armed conflicts, 2007
In 2007, 14 major armed conflicts were
active in 13 locations around the world.
Africa
Americas
Asia-
Afghanistan
-
India (Kashmir)
-
Myanmar (Karen State)
-
Philippines
-
Philippines (Mindanao)
-
Sri Lanka (‘Tamil Eelam’)
Europe
Middle East-
Iraq
-
Israel (Palestinian territories)
-
Turkey (Kurdistan)
Over the past decade the global number
of active major armed conflicts has
declined over all, but the decline has been
very uneven, with major drops in 2002
and 2004 and an increase in 2005.
Three of the major armed conflicts in
2007 were not active in 2006 (i.e. had
not started or had fewer than 25 battlerelated
deaths): Peru, the Philippines
(Mindanao) and Somalia. Three conflicts
in 2006 were no longer active in
2007: Burundi, Sudan and Uganda.
Four of the 14 major armed conflicts
that were active in 2007 increased in
intensity compared to 2006: Sri Lanka
(Tamil Eelam), Afghanistan, Myanmar
(Karen State) and Turkey (Kurdistan). In
the latter three, battle-related deaths
increased by more than 50 per cent.
In all three locations, state
weakness was one of the
critical factors stimulating the
fragmentation and the growing
intractability of armed violence in
2007. In order to reduce violence
in weak, conflict-torn states,
efforts to support state building
that combine functionality with
local legitimacy should be seen as
a priority. Domestically generated
movements that enjoy considerable
popular support and pursue broad
social, political and security
agendas may be most capable of
achieving this combination—even
if their ideologies and agendas
are significantly different from
those promoted by the leading
international actors.
For the fourth consecutive year no
interstate conflict was recorded in 2007.
Only three major armed conflicts were
fought between states during the entire
period 1998–2007: Eritrea–Ethiopia
(1998–2000); India–Pakistan (1998–
2003); and Iraq versus the USA and its
allies (2003). The remaining 30 major
armed con flicts recorded for this period
were all fought within states.
In 2007 four conflicts were categorized
as internationalized—that is, they included
troops from a state that was not a primary
party to the conflict but was aiding one of
the conflict parties. This is an increase of
one over the number in 2006. Just as in
2006, all the internationalized conflicts
in 2007 were in some way linked to the
US-led ‘global war on terrorism’.
While major armed conflicts are the most
intense and result in largest battle-related
death tolls, they only comprise roughly
half of all state-based conflicts and about
one fourth of all armed conflicts, including
non-state based conflicts fought between
non-state actors, mostly in Africa and Asia.
2C. The human security approach to direct and structural
violence
Albrecht Schnabel
Human suffering on an
individual level and conflict
and violence on communal, regional
and international levels can be
significantly reduced if individuals
and communities feel secure and
protected from the threats that
emanate from direct and structural
violence—that is, if their basic
human security is guaranteed.
In contrast, violation of the basic
human needs of individuals and
communities leads to human
suffering and social and communal
deterioration, and therefore to
more violence in its direct and
structural manifestations. This, in
turn, perpetuates the frustration of
human needs. Breaking this cyclical
relationship hinges on the ability to
reduce or avoid violence and thus
provide human security.
The concept of human security is
much debated and has been given
varying definitions by scholars and
governments alike. ‘Human security
threats’ are identified here as those
that threaten the lives of individuals
and communities through direct and
structural violence. This approach is
manageable both in research and in
practice. Although it covers threats
posed by both direct and structural
violence, the approach applies an
impact threshold requiring violence
to be life-threatening to individuals
and communities. The mere
avoidance of direct and structural
violence does not satisfy the full
range of requirements for positive
peace, broad human security
provision and the satisfaction of the
complete hierarchy of human needs.
Yet it offers a manageable definition
that links population security
with national security, structural
violence with direct violence, and
accountability for human insecurity
with responsibility for the provision
of human security.
Opting for direct and structural
violence as interdependent core
variables in human security analysis
and provision offers opportunities
to address the most crucial threats
to populations and to prepare the
grounds for the most effective
mitigation mechanisms. Human
insecurity mitigation requires:
-
population- and context-specific
threat and violence identification
and analysis;
- threat-, context- and actorspecific
designs of preventive and
response measures;
- targeted prevention of direct and
structural violence through multiactor
strategies; and
- monitoring and assessment
of threat levels and of the
implementation of mitigation and
adaptation measures.
While such a systematic approach
is relevant in the presence of
structural violence—which is not
always easy to recognize and where
the identification of responsible
causes and actors are a challenge
at best—attention must be paid to
the role of armed violence and its
potential for escalating existing and
creating new waves of direct and
structural violence.
3. Planning and deploying peace operations
Sharon Wiharta
The continuing rise in the
demand for peace operations
and the growing diversity in their
political, humanitarian and military
nature and complexity require a
more nuanced approach to operation
planning. Planning demands
greater internal coordination
among different departments and
agencies and enhanced cooperation
among the multiplicity of external
actors. In 2007 the United Nations,
as part of its wider and longterm
‘Peacekeeping 2010’ reform
strategy, sought to fully implement
its Integrated Missions Planning
Process (IMPP). The IMPP aims to
provide a sequential, coherent and
unified framework for pre-mission
and transition planning of UN
operations.
Although it is a complex process,
pre-deployment planning is
necessary for the success of any
peace operation. Coupled with a
coherent strategy, this planning
can ensure that an operation has
clearly defined objectives and
mandates and is equipped with the
necessary human, material and
financial resources. Lessons gleaned
from previous peace operations in
Kosovo, Liberia and Timor-Leste
indicate that planning needs to
extend beyond a headquarters-based
process and involve a wider set of
stakeholders, particularly the host
government and affected population.
One of the most frequently cited
problems of operation planning
occurs during the implementation
phase, when an operation’s
responsibility is transferred from
headquarters to the field. This is
usually because the team involved
in the planning process is rarely
the same team that will manage
the operation. Nevertheless,
the African Union/UN Hybrid
Operation in Darfur, Sudan
(UNAMID)—distinguished by
its long lead-in time and intensive
planning period—also demonstrated
that even a well-planned mission
may suffer from implementation
challenges.
The examples of UNAMID, the
UN Mission in the Central African
Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)
and the EU Military Operation
in Chad and the Central African
Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA)
illustrate that there are limits
to participation by domestic
stakeholders during pre-deployment
planning. Indeed, an inclusive and
transparent planning process that
embraces the principle of local
ownership can undermine the actual
deployment of a peace operation.
Inclusive operation planning
carries with it an understanding
that there are trade-offs to be made.
Revisions to both the UN and EU
planning processes have been made
in deference to the need to seek
consent from the host government.
However, these revisions neither
match the needs of the situation nor
take into account the demands of the
civilian population.
Peace operations, 2007
A total of 61 peace operations were
conducted in 2007, two more than in
2006 and the highest number since 1999.
This continues a rising trend since 2002,
when 48 operations were carried out. The
known costs of peace operations also
continued to rise in 2007 and the number
of personnel deployed to such operations
reached an all-time high of 169 467.
The number of personnel deployed to
peace operations in 2007 was 2.5 per
cent more than in 2006 and 60 per cent
more than in 2003. Of the deployed
personnel, 150 651 were military
and 18 816 were civilian. The United
Nations remained the largest actor in
peacekeeping, conducting 22 operations—
its largest number since 2000—deploying
90 305 personnel during 2007. A new
record of participating countries was
established during 2007: 119 countries
contributed troops, military observers or
police. NATO deployed the second highest
number of personnel—57 930—in three
operations. The African Union deployed
7371 personnel in three operations. All
three of these organizations increased
their total personnel deployments during
2007. In contrast, the EU deployed 5900
fewer personnel in 2007 than in 2006.
Number of peace operations and personnel deployed, by region, 2007
Region | No. of Operations | Total personnel deployed |
Africa | 18 | 69 355 |
Americas | 3 | 9 406 |
Asia | 10 | 46 019 |
Europe | 20 | 27 018 |
Middle East | 10 | 17 689 |
World | 61 | 169 467 |
Most of the peace operations in Europe
were conducted by regional organizations
and alliances, principally the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE). The UN continues to be the main
actor in Africa, with 10 operations—the
highest number of UN peace operations
in one region—and 58 076 personnel, 85
per cent of all personnel deployed in the
region.
In 2007, 41 per cent of all personnel
were deployed to operations in Africa.
Another 27 per cent were deployed in
Asia, the great majority of whom were
the 41 741 troops participating in the
International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) in Afghanistan.
4. Integrating gender in post-conflict security sector reform
Megan Bastick
Security sector reform (SSR)
is essential to post-conflict
peacebuilding in order to prevent the
reoccurrence of conflict, to enhance
public security, and to create the
conditions for reconstruction and
development. The importance of
women’s participation and gender
equality in peacebuilding and
security is recognized by many
governments and United Nations
and donor agencies. However,
efforts to promote these goals are
often planned and implemented
independently of each other, with
the result that SSR fails to include
women and to address the security
needs of the entire population—
including women, girls and boys.
Post-conflict SSR processes have
used various approaches to address
gender issues.
-
In Afghanistan, Kosovo and
Liberia SSR measures to recruit
and retain women, and to make
security institutions more
responsive to gender issues
presented challenges but also
yielded positive results.
- In Peru, Sierra Leone and Timor-
Leste truth and reconciliation
commissions included
mechanisms to address the
experiences and justice needs of
women.
- Rwandan women parliamentarians
made distinctive
contributions to SSR by uniting
across party and ethnic lines
to address issues of women’s
security.
- In Liberia and Sierra Leone
disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration processes
contributed to developing
operational procedures to ensure
that women and girls are not
excluded, and that the needs of
men and boys are also addressed.
- In Liberia and South Africa
women’s civil society
organizations were important
partners in linking SSR with local
security and justice concerns.
Gender mainstreaming—
assessing the impact of SSR policies
and activities on women, men,
boys and girls at every stage of
the process—is a key strategy. It
must be accompanied by steps to
ensure that both men and women
participate and are represented in
SSR processes.
Participation of women in
post-conflict security services is
crucial to creating structures that
are representative, trusted and
legitimate, and are able to meet
the security needs of both men and
women.
‘Transitional justice’ and justice
reform processes have made
advances in responding to gender
issues. Ad hoc criminal tribunals
have prioritized prosecution of
sexual violence.
Successful integration of
gender in SSR shares the broader
challenges of SSR. External actors
can encourage and support, but
initiatives must be led by local
stakeholders. SSR has much to gain
by integrating gender.
5. Military expenditure
Petter Stålenheim, Catalina Perdomo and Elisabeth Sköns
World military expenditure
is estimated to have been
$1339 billion in 2007—a real-terms
increase of 6 per cent over 2006
and of 45 per cent since 1998. This
corresponded to 2.5 per cent of
world gross domestic product (GDP)
and $202 for each person in the
world.
The subregion with the highest
increase in military expenditure
over the 10-year period 1998–2007
was Eastern Europe, at 162 per
cent. It was also the region with
the highest increase in 2007, at
15 per cent. Russia, with a 13 per
cent increase in 2007, accounted
for 86 per cent of this regional
increase. Other subregions with
10-year growth rates exceeding
50 per cent are North America
(65 per cent), the Middle East
(62 per cent), South Asia (57 per
cent), Africa and East Asia (both
51 per cent). The subregions with
the lowest growth in military
spending over the past 10 years
were Western Europe (6 per cent)
and Central America (14 per cent).
The USA’s military spending
accounted for 45 per cent of the
world total in 2007, followed by
the UK, China, France and Japan,
with 4–5 per cent each. Since
2001 US military expenditure
has increased by 59 per cent in
real terms, principally because
of massive spending on military
operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq, but also because of increases
in the ‘base’ defence budget. By
2007, US spending was higher than
at any time since World War II.
However, because of the growth of
the US economy and of total US
Government spending, the economic
and financial burden of military
spending (i.e. its share of GDP and
of total US Government outlays)
is lower now than during previous
peak spending years in the post-
World War II period.
China has increased its military
spending threefold in real terms
during the past decade. However,
due to its rapid economic growth,
the economic burden of military
spending is still moderate, at 2.1 per
cent of GDP.
Military spending is rising rapidly
in the South Caucasus—Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia—largely
due to the region’s three ‘frozen’
conflicts and the involvement of
external actors. The rises have
been made possible by economic
upswings largely based on oil and
gas revenues.
The number of countries that
increased their military spending
in 2007 was higher than in recent
years. The factors driving increases
in world military spending include
countries’ foreign policy objectives,
real or perceived threats, armed
conflict and policies to contribute
to multilateral peacekeeping
operations, combined with the
availability of economic resources.
Military expenditure, 2007
The USA has by far the largest military
expenditure. US military spending is now
higher than at any time since World War II.
International comparison of military
expenditure data is problematic. SIPRI
uses market exchange rates for its
analysis of military expend iture. The table
below shows the five biggest spenders
ranked according to their military spending
converted into constant (2005) US dollars
using market exchange rates.
The 15 countries with the highest military
expenditure in 2007
in market exchange rate terms
Rank | Country | Spending ($ b.) | World share (%) |
1 | USA | 547 | 45 |
2 | UK | 59.7 | 5 |
3 | China | 58.3 | 5 |
4 | France | 53.6 | 4 |
5 | Japan | 43.6 | 4 |
6 | Germany | 36.9 | 3 |
7 | Russia | 35.4 | 3 |
8 | Saudi Arabia | 33.8 | 3 |
9 | Italy | 33.1 | 3 |
10 | India | 24.2 | 2 |
11 | South Korea | 22.6 | 2 |
12 | Brazil | 15.3 | 1 |
13 | Canada | 15.2 | 1 |
14 | Australia | 15.1 | 1 |
15 | Spain | 14.6 | 1 |
Figures are in US$, at constant (2005) prices and exchange rates.
6. Arms production
Sam Perlo-Freeman and Elisabeth Sköns
Global arms production is
increasing. Arms sales by
the 100 largest arms-producing
companies in the world (excluding
China)—the SIPRI Top 100—
amounted to $315 billion in 2006,
an increase of 9 per cent in nominal
terms and 5 per cent in real terms.
Forty-one US companies accounted
for 63 per cent of the combined arms
sales of the Top 100, while 34 West
European companies accounted for
29 per cent. Generally, companies
specializing in armoured vehicles—
in demand by the USA for the
conflict in Iraq—and in expanding
sectors, such as military services
and high-technology electronics and
communications, had the biggest
increases in arms sales in 2006.
Russian companies also experienced
high growth rates during 2006,
primarily in aerospace and air
defence.
There were 53 significant mergers
and acquisitions in the North
American and West European arms
industry in 2007. Three of these
were cross-border deals within
Europe and 16 were transatlantic
deals. Almost all the transatlantic
mergers and acquisitions
were between British and US
companies. Most of the merger and
acquisition activity was related
to military services or to subsystems,
especially electronics and
aerospace. Seven acquisitions had
values over $1 billion. Four of these
were domestic US acquisitions,
two involved the acquisition of US
companies by a British firm, and
one the acquisition of a British
operation by a US company.
In Western Europe, 2007 saw
major naval consolidation deals in
France and the UK, both actively
encouraged by the respective
government. The French stateowned
shipbuilder DCN took over
the naval operations of Thales in a
deal worth $714 million, while in the
UK BAE Systems and VT Group
agreed a joint venture amalgamating
their surface shipbuilding and
service operations.
There was a continued political
push within the European Union
(EU) in 2007 to promote a more
integrated intra-EU arms industry
and market. The European Defence
Agency (EDA) agreed two strategy
documents, one on building a
European defence-technological
and industrial base and the other on
a military research and technology
strategy. The European Commission
proposed two directives, one to open
up intra-EU arms procurement,
the other to relax export control
regulations for intra-EU arms
transfers.
The Russian Government
continued to consolidate the arms
industry into large state-owned
conglomerates. In 2007 the United
Aircraft Corporation (UAC)—which
amalgamates most of Russia’s civil
and military fixed-wing aircraft
production—commenced operation
and two new conglomerates were
created: the United Shipbuilding
Corporation (USC)—which
consolidates the shipbuilding
sector—and Rostekhnologii—which
amalgamates military and civilian
manufacturers and raw materials
suppliers with Rosoboronexport, the
state arms export agency.
The SIPRI Top 100
The SIPRI Top 100 list ranks the largest
arms-producing companies in the world
(outside China) according to their arms
sales. The 10 largest companies in 2006
are listed below.
The 10 largest arms-producing companies, 2006
Rank | Company (country) | Arms sales, 2006 ($ m.) | Profit, 2006 ($ m.) |
1 | Boeing (USA) | 30 690 | 2 215 |
2 | Lockheed Martin (USA) | 28 120 | 2 529 |
3 | BAE Systems (UK) | 24 060 | 1 189 |
4 | Northrop Grumman (USA) | 23 650 | 1 542 |
5 | Raytheon (USA) | 19 530 | 1 283 |
6 | General Dynamics (USA) | 18 770 | 1 856 |
7 | EADS (West Europe) | 12 600 | 124 |
8 | L-3 Communications (USA) | 9 980 | 526 |
9 | Finmeccanica (Italy) | 8 990 | 1 280 |
10 | Thales (France) | 8 240 | 487 |
Twelve companies entered the Top 100
list for 2006, six of them for the first time.
US companies dominate the Top 100 list,
both numerically and financially, with West
European companies some way behind.
Regional/national shares of arms sales for the SIPRI Top 100 for 2006
Region or country | No. of companies | Arms sales, 2006 ($ b.) |
USA | 41 | 200.2 |
Western Europe | 34 | 92.1 |
Russia | 8 | 6.1 |
Japan | 4 | 5.2 |
Israel | 4 | 4.6 |
India | 3 | 3.5 |
South Korea | 3 | 1.8 |
Singapore | 1 | 0.9 |
Australia | 1 | 0.5 |
Canada | 1 | 0.5 |
Total | 100 | 315.3 |
Figures for a country or region refer to the arms sales
of Top 100 companies head quartered in that country
or region, including those in its foreign subsidiaries,
and thus do not reflect the sales of arms actually
produced in that country or region.
The largest acquisitions in the West European and North American arms
industry, 2007
Buyer company | Acquired company | Deal value ($ m.) |
General Electric | Smiths Aerospace | 4 800 |
BAE Systems | Armor Holdings | 4 532 |
URS Corporation | Washington Group Intl | 3 100 |
Carlyle Group | ARINC | .. |
ITT Corporation | EDO Corporation | 1 700 |
Meggitt | K&F Industries | 1 300 |
Veritas Capital | Aeroflex | 1 300 |
Textron | United Industrial Corporation | 1 100 |
7. International arms transfers
Paul Holtom, Mark Bromley and Pieter D. Wezeman
Approximately 80 per cent of
the volume of exports of major
conventional weapons for the period
2003–2007 were accounted for by
the five largest suppliers—the USA,
Russia, Germany, France and the
UK. Although these five suppliers
are likely to continue to account
for an overwhelmingly large share
of international arms transfers,
concerns were expressed in 2007
regarding the export prospects
for French and Russian major
conventional weapons.
Asia, Europe and the Middle East
continued to be the largest recipient
regions for the period 2003–2007.
The largest recipient countries
were China, India, the United
Arab Emirates (UAE), Greece
and South Korea. However, 2007
gave the first signs of a potentially
significant change among the
largest recipients, with decreased
deliveries to and orders by China.
The largest suppliers to Asia and the
Middle East will continue to engage
in intense competition for export
orders, with Libya and Saudi Arabia
likely to become large recipients
once again.
SIPRI data show the volume of
international arms transfers to South
America in the period 2003–2007 to
be 47 per cent higher than in 1998–
2002. Despite attention-grabbing
headlines and some evidence of
competitive behaviour (e.g. the
nature and timing of acquisitions by
Brazil, Columbia and Venezuela), it
seems unlikely that South America
is in the midst of a classically
defined arms race. Acquisitions
have been primarily motivated
by efforts to replace or upgrade
military inventories in order to
maintain existing capabilities; to
respond to predominantly domestic
security threats; to strengthen
ties with supplier governments; to
enhance domestic arms industry
capability; or to bolster regional or
international profile.
Arms suppliers meet the demand
for weapons that a conflict creates
for a number of reasons: to gain
political and economic influence,
to substitute for an interested
external party’s direct military
presence and to meet the powerful
economic pressures to sell arms.
The international transfer of arms
to conflict zones in Afghanistan
and Sudan illustrates a number of
related tendencies. First, UN arms
embargoes imposed on armed nonstate
actors have thus far failed to
stop their arms acquisitions. Second,
major arms suppliers have been
willing to show their support for
the government in a conflict zone
by directly supplying it with arms.
Third, internationally sanctioned
peacekeeping operations often
struggle to obtain suitable arms and
military equipment.
The suppliers and recipients of major conventional weapons, 2007
The five largest suppliers of major conventional weapons and their main recipients, 2003–2007
Supplier | Share of global arms transfers (%) | Main recipients (share of supplier’s transfers, %) |
USA | 31 | South Korea (12), Israel (12), UAE (9), Greece (8) |
Russia | 25 | China (45),
India (22),
Venezuela (5),
Algeria (4) |
|
Germany | 10 | Turkey (15),
Greece (14),
South Africa (12),
Australia (9) |
France | 9 | UAE (41),
Greece (12),
Saudi Arabia (9),
Singapore (7) |
UK | 4 | USA (17),
Romania (9),
Chile (9),
India (8) |
The five largest recipients of major conventional weapons, 2003–2007
Recipient | Share of global arms imports (%) |
China | 12 |
India | 8 |
UAE | 7 |
Greece | 6 |
South Korea | 5 |
8. Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation
Shannon N. Kile
In 2007 Iran’s nuclear programme
remained at the centre of
international controversy. Iran
continued to install gas centrifuges
at its pilot uranium enrichment
plant at Natanz, leading the United
Nations Security Council to adopt
Resolution 1747, demanding that
Iran suspend all enrichment-related
and reprocessing activities and
imposing additional sanctions on
Iran.
In August Iran and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) finalized a work
plan to address outstanding
safeguards compliance issues in Iran
and set a timeline for concluding
remaining issues related to the
IAEA’s investigation into Iran’s past
nuclear activities. However, there
continued to be controversy over
allegations that Iran had carried out
undeclared studies related to nuclear
weapons. In December the USA
released an unclassified summary
of a new National Intelligence
Estimate that concluded ‘with high
confidence’ that Iran had halted
its nuclear weapon programme in
the autumn of 2003 and had not
resumed it.
In February 2007 the Six-Party
Talks—between China, Japan,
North Korea, South Korea, Russia
and the USA—agreed an Action
Plan under which North Korea
would shut down for the ‘purpose of
eventual dismantlement’ its nuclear
facilities at Yongbyon in return
for energy assistance and other
economic and political benefits.
However, North Korea failed to
disable the nuclear facilities and to
provide a comprehensive declaration
of its nuclear programmes and
past activites by the year-end
deadline set out in an October 2007
agreement for implementing the
Action Plan. There were two main
controversies left unresolved by
the North Korean declaration: how
much plutonium North Korea had
separated; and whether North Korea
had engaged in suspected work on
uranium enrichment.
India and the USA announced a
draft ‘123 agreement’ that specified
the terms governing the resumption
of Indian–US trade in nuclear
material and technology that was
envisaged in the 2005 Indian–US
Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative
(CNCI). The draft agreement
was criticized in the USA for
contravening conditions imposed
by the US Congress in 2006 which
were aimed at ensuring that the
CNCI complied with US nonproliferation
and other legislation. It continued to face strong political
opposition in India.
In Geneva the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) again failed to
open the long-delayed negotiations
on a global fissile material cut-off
treaty. The CD remained unable to
adopt a work programme because of
a dispute over whether to establish
negotiating committees for other
items on its agenda. Several states
continued to show a general lack of
enthusiasm for concluding a ban, at
least in the near term, on producing
fissile material for weapon purposes.
World nuclear forces, 2008
At the beginning of 2008 eight nuclear
weapon states possessed almost 10 200
operational nuclear weapons. Several
thousand of these nuclear weapons are
kept on high alert, ready to be launched
within minutes. If all nuclear warheads are
counted—operational warheads, spares,
those in both active and inactive storage,
and intact warheads scheduled for later
dismantlement, these states together
possess a total of more than 25 000
warheads.
World nuclear forces, January 2008
Country | Strategic warheads | Nonstrategic warheads | Total no. of deployed warheads |
USA | 3 575 | 500 | 4 075 |
Russia | 3 113 | 2 076 | 5 189 |
UK | 185 | – | 185 |
France | 348 | – | 348 |
China | 161 | 15 | 176 |
India | – | – | 60–70 |
Pakistan | – | – | 60 |
Israel | – | – | 80 |
Total | | | 10 183 |
All figures are approximate
The five states defined by the 1968
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as nuclear
weapon states—China, France, Russia,
the UK and the USA—were all in the
process of deploying new nuclear weapons
or had announced their intentions to do
so in 2007. India and Pakistan, which with
Israel are de facto nuclear weapon states
outside the NPT, continued to develop
new missile systems capable of delivering
nuclear weapons. North Korea claimed
in 2005 that it had developed nuclear
weapons and conducted a nuclear test in
2006, but there is no public information to
verify that North Korea has weaponized its
nuclear capability.
As of 2007, global stocks of highly
enriched uranium totalled approximately
1370 tonnes (not including 346 tonnes to
be blended down). Global military stocks of
separated plutonium totalled approximately
228–282 tonnes and civilian stocks
totalled 244.9 tonnes.
The United States continues to pursue
an expansive array of programmes for
active defence against perceived emerging
threats from ballistic missiles, including
missiles potentially carrying nuclear
warheads
Funding for the US Missile Defense Agency, financial years 2003–13
Year Funding
|
2003 | 6 714 |
2004 | 7 674 |
2005 | 9 169 |
2006 | 7 695 |
2007 | 9 388 |
2008 | 8 899 |
2008–13 [a] | 56 666 |
Figures are for requested funds, in US $m. at current
prices. Years are financial years (1 Oct.–30 Sep.).
Figures do not include Defense-Wide Resources
funding for missile defence pro grammes.
[a] This is a projected figure.
In 2007 the US Government Accountability
Office (GAO) estimated that the USA had
spent $107 billion on missile defence
since the mid-1980s.
Appendix 8D. Nuclear forensic analysis
Vitaly Fedchenko
Many international treaties
and national laws require
mechanisms to verify compliance.
Many such mechanisms rely on
technology, and so encourage the
development of better technical
means for verification. Nuclear
forensic analysis (nuclear forensics)
is a newly emerging scientific
discipline with direct applications
in treaty verification and law
enforcement. It is defined as ‘the
analysis of a sample of nuclear
or radioactive material and any
associated information to provide
evidence for determining the history
of the sample material’.
Individual nuclear forensic
techniques were first developed
during World War II when the
USA collected samples of air and
water in the vicinity of alleged
German reactors in order to verify
if plutonium production was taking
place. They were routinely used
in the context of Russian–US
bilateral arms control treaties
verification. With the emergence of
the phenomenon of illicit trafficking
of nuclear and radioactive materials
in the early 1990s, nuclear
forensics began to be applied to
investigating many individual cases.
Technological advances provided
an opportunity for nuclear forensics
to be successfully used in verifying
a country’s compliance with the
International Atomic Energy
Agency’s safeguards. For instance,
the collection of environmental
(‘swipe’) samples at the nuclear
fuel reprocessing line in Yongbyon,
North Korea, in 1992 demonstrated
that North Korea failed to declare
all plutonium separation activities.
Analysis of similar samples
collected in Iran in 2003 provided
strong evidence of undeclared
uranium enrichment activities and
helped to uncover the clandestine
nuclear trade network led by Abdul
Qadeer Khan.
The development of the
verification mechanism for the
1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-
Ban Treaty has demonstrated that
nuclear forensic techniques can
play a crucial role in confirming
the nuclear nature of an explosion
and determining key features of
the explosive device. The same
technologies will be essential for
attribution of a nuclear explosive
device if one were ever used in a
terrorist attack. Nuclear forensics
will also be pertinent to verification
of the proposed fissile material cutoff
treaty, because it can determine
the ‘age’ (i.e. time since the last
purification) of nuclear material and
thus whether it was produced before
a certain date.
The amount of information that
can be obtained from application of
nuclear forensic techniques depends
on access to relevant sites and
samples, which is often limited by
legal or political considerations.
9. Reducing security threats from chemical and biological
materials
John Hart and Peter Clevestig
Chemical and biological warfare
(CBW) prevention and response
measures encompass non-state
and threat scenarios such as those
involving improvised devices
that contain toxic chemicals or
pathogens. Actors that were on
the periphery of efforts to prohibit
CBW, such as public health
providers, are now routinely
included in threat perceptions and
risk analyses. The developing field
of microbial forensics is integral to
bio-preparedness planning and law
enforcement.
As of December 2007
approximately 26 000 agent tonnes
of chemical weapons had been
verifiably destroyed (of about 71 000
agent tonnes declared). Twelve
states had declared 65 chemical
weapon production facilities, of
which 42 had been destroyed and 19
converted for peaceful purposes not
prohibited under the 1993 Chemical
Weapons Convention.
The temporary three-person
Implementation Support Unit,
established by the Sixth Review
Conference of the 1972 Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC), began operation in August
2007. It receives and distributes
politically binding information
exchanges meant to serve as
confidence-building measures
(CBMs) among the BTWC parties.
In 2007 it produced a CD-ROM
containing all CBM returns in
1987–2007.
In 2007 the United Nations
Special Commission on Iraq
(UNMOVIC) was disbanded. An
Iraqi court sentenced Ali Hassan al-
Majid (‘Chemical Ali’) for his role
in the 1988 Anfal campaign against
the Kurdish population in northern
Iraq where chemical weapons were
used.
A series of chlorine attacks
occurred in Iraq in 2007 that injured
or killed many. The use of chemicals
together with conventional
explosives for dispersal caused
concern that insurgents might refine
their dispersal techniques.
The use of chlorine was also a
factor in discussions in the USA on
how to protect its municipal water
supplies and whether to replace
chlorine with other chemicals.
Failures in bio-containment and
bio-security received wide publicity
in 2007, including at facilities where
awareness and compliance with
procedures were thought to be high.
One such breach occurred in August
at a farm near Pirbright, UK, where
an outbreak of foot-and-mouth
disease (FMD) was discovered.
In order to maintain and
strengthen the international
prohibition against CBW, studies
bridging the gap between political
and technical issues should continue
to be carried out to:
-
inform analyses of how dual-use
technologies and equipment are
handled in practice, and
- to promote better understanding
of the derivation and use of
information.
9A. International public health diplomacy and the global
surveillance of avian influenza
Bernice Raveché
Influenza has caused some of
the most devastating epidemics
in human history, and experts
widely agree that another influenza
pandemic is on the horizon. Avian
influenza, a variation of the H5N1
virus, is a likely candidate for
the next strain to cause a global
influenza pandemic.
Globalization has multiplied the
quantity and types of international
flows of people and goods. Given the
potential for globalization to cause
or exacerbate public health problems
in different parts of the World, the
World Health Organization (WHO)
is likely to play an important role
as part of a collective effort to
build societal security. The role
of the WHO in governing global
health is changing, as evidenced
by the revised International
Health Regulations (IHR) that
were adopted in 2005 and began
to be implemented in June 2007.
Because of the IHR’s long history of
ineffectiveness and non-compliance
by a minority of member states, the
WHO revised the IHR using a legal
framework that gives the WHO
an unprecedented legal authority
over the global disease surveillance
and reporting requirements of the
member states. The new IHR have
serious implications for the actions
required of countries with cases of
severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) and H5N1.
Indonesia is currently the ‘hot
zone’ of the H5N1 outbreak in
both humans and poultry, but in
December 2006 the Indonesian
Government withheld samples
from the WHO because of uneven
distribution of influenza vaccines,
especially those made from virus
samples collected in Indonesia. The
Indonesian Government demanded
that prior approval be obtained
for the development of a vaccine
from a virus found in the country
and that a discount price for such a
vaccine be negotiated for countries
where the H5N1 virus is endemic.
This stalemate was in violation of
the revised IHR. However, in early
2008, Indonesia received assurance
that its rights to vaccines produced
from avian influenza samples would
be recognized, and the country sent
12 avian influenza samples to the
WHO.
The revised IHR reflect a shifting
paradigm in global health as well as
the changing role of the WHO. The
future will show if the WHO can
maintain impartiality and neutrality
throughout the implementation
of the revised IHR. If the WHO
cannot prove its credibility to
both developing and developed
countries, it will lose its place as the
leading international global health
organization and global health will
be further dictated by individual
countries’ foreign policy.
10. Conventional arms control
Zdzislaw Lachowski
The year 2007 witnessed the
biggest challenge yet to the
1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) when
Russia ‘suspended’ its participation
in the regime. The brinkmanship
over the treaty is a reflection of
the wider spectrum of political
and military issues that divide the
participants in the Organization
for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE) rather than a
conflict in its own right. Russia’s
separation of its legal arms control
obligations and its 1999 Istanbul
political commitments put it at
loggerheads with other CFE parties
which insist on treating the CFE
process as a whole. The Western
states have belatedly acknowledged
the need to pay more serious
attention to Russia’s CFE-related
concerns. However, given Russia’s
current behaviour and its nonobservance
of the treaty’s flank
restrictions, a quick reconciliation
does not seem likely. In addition,
both the members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and states that are poised
to join the agreed adapted CFE
regime will be unwilling to accede
to a treaty that is to be substantially
changed to accommodate the
demands of one party, at the
apparent expense of others’ sense of
security.
Paradoxically, despite—or
because of—the CFE crisis, arms
control has moved up the European
security agenda. The weakening of
the CFE arms control regime has
led to some disquieting reactions
in the South Caucasus, while in
Moldova the deadlock over the
removal of Russian personnel and
equipment persisted. In contrast,
implementation of the 2005
Georgia–Russia agreement on the
closure of Russian military bases
and facilities in Georgia was all but
completed, while the subregional
arms control regime in the Balkans
continued to operate smoothly.
With ‘hard’ arms control
deadlocked, a ‘soft’ arms control
regime of confidence- and securitybuilding
measures has been
suggested as a substitute. However,
with confidence being undermined
in one place, it is difficult to
restore and develop it in another.
Nevertheless, the OSCE Code
of Conduct on Politico-Military
Aspects of Security retains its
relevance, and other confidencebuilding
steps among OSCE
participants continue to focus on
the multiple dangers created by
surplus stockpiles of small arms,
ammunition and toxic rocket fuel.
The number of states adhering
to the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mines
Convention rose to 156, taking it
further towards universalization.
More and more countries are
participating in the ‘Oslo process’ to
ban the use of cluster munitions.
11. Controls on security-related international transfers
Ian Anthony, Sibylle Bauer and Anna Wetter
Export controls are preventive
measures intended to ensure
that exported goods do not
contribute to activities in other
countries that are either illegal or
undesirable from the perspective
of the exporting state. The role of
export controls in supporting the
main multilateral non-proliferation
treaties is now supplemented by
the important role that they play
in implementing decisions of the
United Nations Security Council on
particular countries (such as Iran or
North Korea).
A number of multilateral
cooperation arrangements attempt
to improve the effectiveness of the
participating states’ national export
controls. The participation in these
arrangements continued to expand
in 2007 when Croatia joined the
Australia Group. The Wassenaar
Arrangement on Export Controls for
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use
Goods and Technologies completed
a review and evaluation of its overall
performance.
In 2007 the European
Commission proposed simplifying
the rules governing transfers
of items specially designed and
developed for military use from
one European Union (EU) member
state to another. The Commission
has also proposed modifications to
the legislation governing exports
of items that are not specifically
designed or developed for military
use but that can have military uses
(‘dual-use items’).
In 2006 and 2007 the UN Security
Council adopted resolutions that
prohibit and restrict certain types
of international trade with Iran as
part of a wider effort to address
nuclear proliferation concerns. The
prohibitions and restrictions decided
by the UN focus on items that could
contribute to the most sensitive
activities from a proliferation
perspective—uranium enrichment,
the recovery of plutonium and the
development of ballistic missiles
that could deliver a nuclear weapon.
The EU has taken steps to translate
the UN decisions into rules binding
on EU exporters. Indeed, the EU has
extended the range of prohibitions
and restrictions on trade with Iran
beyond those mandated by the UN.
Export control authorities’
enforcement of both export
controls and non-proliferation
sanctions requires that legal bases
be adapted and institutional setups
and procedures rethought.
Effective enforcement demands the
active, competent and cooperative
involvement of a range of national
actors—including customs, police,
intelligence and prosecution
services—and an appropriate legal
framework—including penalties
for export control violations. An
international debate about what
constitutes dissuasive, effective and
proportionate sanctions in response
to violations of export control law
has been initiated, in particular
within the EU.
Source: http://www.sipri.org/
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